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FACTOR AND PRODUCT MARKET TRADABILITY AND EQUILIBRIUM
 
IN PACIFIC RIM PORK INDUSTRIES
 
Abstract:	 This paper uses a new market analysis methodology to examine price and trade 
relationships in eight Pacific Rim factor and product markets central to the Canadian 
and U.S. pork industries. The new method enables direct estimation of the frequency 
with which a variety of market conditions occur, including competitive equilibrium, 
tradability, and segmented equilibrium. While extraordinary profit opportunities 
emerge episodically in a few niche markets, the vast majority of the markets studied 
are highly competitive - exhibiting zero marginal profits to spatial arbitrage at 
monthly frequency - and internationally contestable. In spite of continued high 
international transfer costs, the Pacific Rim is effectively a single market for pork 
producers and processors today. 
Keywords:	 com, feed, hogs, international trade, law of one price, market integration, meats, 
soybean meal, spatial equilibrium 
• 
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Ongoing structural shifts in the North American pork industry raise important questions 
regarding the nature of international hog and feed factor markets and pork product markets. 
Canadian and United States pork production and processing are both increasingly industrialized, and 
each nation is now a net pork exporter. Since the gains in international competitiveness for Canadian 
and U.S. pork producers and processors seem increasingly likely to corne from lowering unit costs 
through exploitation of emerging economies of scale, the definition and development of accessible 
factor and product markets is central to the long-term health of the industry in both countries. And 
because the biggest pork markets and the fastest growth in consumption and trade are found in the 
Pacific Rim countries of Asia and North America, this region is of particular interest to Canadian 
and U.S. suppliers. Both countries have seen significant expansion of processing capacity in the 
west, based largely on plans to expand exports to Pacific Rim markets. In this paper, we therefore 
study price and trade relationships in pork factor and product markets among the major Pacific pork 
economies. 
Prevailing market integration testing methods - e.g., correlation coefficients, Granger 
causality, cointegration, error correction mechanisms - are unreliable under a variety of conditions 
because they rely solely on price data and make strong, often unrealistic assumptions about trading 
behavior and costs. These level I methods) fail when trade is discontinuous or bidirectional, and 
when transactions costs are considerable or nonstationary (Dahlgran and Blank 1992, Barrett 1996, 
McNew 1996, Baulch 1997, McNew and Fackler 1997, Fackler and Goodwin forthcoming). Such 
conditions are common in the face of intraindustry trade due to economies of scale and product 
• 
differentiation, seasonality in demand and supply, and trade policy reforms and technological change 
in shipping, storage and communications. As we demonstrate below, such conditions prevail in the 
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Pacific Rim markets we study. 
Baulch (1997), introducing his parity bounds model (PBM), shows that the use ofboth price 
and shipping cost data (level IT analysis), combined with maximum likelihood estimation methods 
that relax many untenable assumptions about the nature of intermarket price relationships, can 
eliminate many of the biases of traditional price analysis (level nmethods. But as Barrett (1996) 
argues, failure to take advantage of the information available in trade flow data still limits the 
inferential capacity of level IT methods. 
Li and Barrett (1999) introduce what appears to be the first level III method, one that uses 
the information in price, trade, and marketing cost data. The Li-Barrett method (LBM) permits 
distinction between market integration, reflecting the tradability of products between spatially 
distinct markets - equivalent to contestability between markets - irrespective of the existence or 
absence of spatial market equilibrium, and competitive market equilibrium, in which extraordinary 
marginal profits are exhausted by competitive pressures to yield socially efficient allocations, 
regardless of whether this results in physical trade flows between markets. This paper applies the 
LBM to a new, rich data set on factor and product markets for the pork industries of several Pacific 
Rim economies. 
Estimating Market Condition Frequencies 
The core virtue of the LBM lies in its capacity to use the information from multiple, 
interrelated data sources to distinguish between interrelated but distinct concepts of market	 • 
... 
equilibrium and market integration. The two are not synonymous in spite of current praxis. A 
good definition of market integration is the influence of one market by another through the 
3 
Walrasian transfer of excess demand. When two markets are integrated, supply and demand in 
the one market affect the price and/or transactions volume in the other. This definition of 
integration is closely related to the concepts of tradability or contestability (Baumol 1982). By 
this definition, markets can be (imperfectly) integrated even when imperfectly competitive or 
inefficiently restricted by trade barriers or collusion, whether or not physical flows occur between 
the markets, and whether or not price in one market responds (especially one-for-one) to shocks 
in the other. 
This more practical and intuitive defintion of market integration-cum-tradability does not 
equate to competitive equilibrium. Following the familiar logic of spatial equilibrium models, 
two markets, i and j, are in long-run competitive equilibrium, meaning that marginal profits to 
intennarket arbitrage equal zero, when Pit ~ 't(Pit, Pjt, Cijt) + Pjt, with Pit the price at location i in 
time t, and 't the transactions costs of spatial arbitrage, which may be a function of prices (e.g., in 
the case of ad valorem or variable rate tariffs or insurance) and the exogenous costs of transport 
between the two locations at time t, Cijt. The equilibrium condition binds with equality when trade 
occurs. But when trade does not occur, the constraint may be slack so there may be no 
correlation among market prices in spite of the existence of competitive equilibrium.2 When two 
markets are both integrated and in long-run competitive equilibrium, they may be classified as 
"perfectly integrated," the special case on which the existing market integration literature 
focuses, as shown by Goldberg and Knetter's (1997) recent review. Tests of the law of one price 
(LOP), for example, are a test of the perfect integration hypothesis, not a test of (perhaps 
-
...imperfect) integration or of (perhaps segmented) competitive equilibrium. 
The LBM builds on switching regimes models, notably Baulch's (1997) parity bounds 
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model (PBM), that compare observed intermarket price differentials against observed costs of 
intermarket transport, thereby estimating the probability that markets are in competitive 
equilibrium (Spiller and Huang 1986, Sexton, Kling, and Carman 1991, Baulch 1997). This 
approach hurdles the problems of discontinuous trade, and time-varying and potentially 
nonstationary transactions costs that bedevil pure price analysis methods. But absent trade flows 
data, it still conflates the concepts of equilibrium and integration. Price differentials less than 
transfer costs are identified as "integration" even when there is no flow of product and no 
transmission of price shocks between the two markets. Conversely, markets are classified as 
"segmented" whenever price differentials exceed transfer costs, regardless of whether there are 
observed trade flows. 
Since we can never observe all possible transactions costs involved in trade (e.g., 
subjective risk premia, discount rates, quasi-option values), trade flow information can offer 
indirect evidence of the effects of unobservable or omitted transactions costs, thereby providing 
fuller information with which to analyze market relationships. It is common, for example, to find 
that trade does (not) occur even when price differentials exceed (are less than) transfer costs­
defined as the observable portion of transactions costs - implying that some unobservable effects 
(e.g., trade barriers, unmeasured transactions costs, information gaps) exist and influence 
intermarket trade. If markets are imperfectly competitive, there may be positive rents associated 
with arbitrage in equilibrium and if one or both markets experience shocks, arbitrage conditions 
may be violated during market disequilibrium. In short, if traders are rational profit-maximizers, 
• 
trade flow data convey additional information about market integration beyond that offered by 
observable price and transfer cost data. So it makes sense to exploit such data in markets 
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analysis. 
The LBM interprets the observed distribution of market prices as a mixture of 
observations drawn from different distributional regimes corresponding to distinct market 
conditions. This mixture distribution estimation approach is well suited to time-varying market 
conditions, such as exist for most international agricultural markets. There exist six distinct 
market regimes. Trade is either observed (odd numbered regimes) or not (even numbered 
regimes). Price differentials may equal transfer costs (regimes 1 and 2), implying binding 
arbitrage conditions and tradability, regardless of whether trade occurs or not. Or price 
differentials may exceed transfer costs (regimes 3 and 4), implying the existence of positive 
profits to intermarket arbitrage. Finally, when price differentials do not fully cover transfer costs 
(regimes 5 and 6), trade brings negative profit to arbitrageurs. Letting pi and pi be the prices in 
locations i andj, respectively, 1}i be the observable transfer costs fromj to i, and L)"i=l, the six 
regimes are summarized in Table 1. 
In estimating the probability of observing the ilb regime (A'i)' we have only partial 
information: the binary observation of trade or no trade. So we estimate a mixture model, 
maximizing the likelihood associated with the regime frequencies found in sample, conditional 
on knowing whether trade occurs or not and the distribution assumption made about the errors 
associated with each regime. We assume all regimes are subject to iid normal sampling and 
measurement error, vI' with zero mean and variance a 2v • Regimes 3-6 also include a one-sided 
error, ul' that is independent of VI and is iid half-normal with variance a 2 u • The half-normal error 
-
...is added to (subtracted from) Tji + VI for regimes 3 and 4 (5 and 6). Using the density of the sum 
of a normal random variable and a truncated normal random variable (Weinstein 1964), the 
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distribution functions for the observations in each regime are: 
(1)f,l = f,2 =_1 l/J[Y, -T,] 
(j. (j. 
(2) 
(3) 
where T, and Y, are intermarket transfer costs and price differentials, respectively, at time t, <I> is 
the standard normal density function and ~ is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. The likelihood of observing the sample price, transfer cost, and trade data can therefore 
be written: 
T (4)
L = IT {A'[AJ/ + Ad,3 + Asf,s]+(l- A).[A2f,2 + A4f,4 + A6f,6]}
 
,=1
 
where A is a dummy variable for the occurrence of trade: A=1 if trade is observed and A=O 
otherwise. The probabilities of each regime and the variances 0 2 u and 0 2 v can be estimated by 
maximizing the logarithm of equation (4), subject to the constraints that Ak~O Vk, and ~Ak=1.3 
This method permits construction of several useful indicators of the frequency with which 
particular market conditions prevail. Intermarket tradability (A1+A2+A3+As) occurs whenever 
trade is observed or the intermarket arbitrage condition is binding, so that traders are indifferent 
between trading or not. Competitive equilibrium (A1+A2+A6) occurs whenever the intermarket 
arbitrage (zero marginal trader profit) condition holds. Two markets are thus perfectly integrated 
-
... 
with frequency (A 1+A2), inefficiently integrated with frequency (A3+As), in segmented equilibrium 
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with frequency A6, and in segmented disequilibirium (neither integrated nor in long-run 
competitive equilibrium) with frequency A4• These conditions describe essentially all market 
conditions of interest to economists and their business and trade policy clients. 
The regimes of most concern to economists are typically those reflecting violations of 
long-run competitive equilibrium. In regime 3, trade occurs and appears to earn positive 
marginal profits. This implies either (1) insufficient market arbitrage, due either to fonnal or 
infonnal nontariff trade barriers or to temporary disequilibria (e.g., due to infonnational or 
contracting lags) that generate rents, or (2) the existence of significant unobservable transactions 
costs that fill in the gap between the price differential and observable transfer costs. In regime 4, 
apparent positive profits go wholly unexploited by traders. The plausible explanations for this 
observation are the same as for regime 3, but the behavioral effect is extremal. Parallel logic 
holds in regime 5, where transfer costs exceed price differentials yet trade occurs despite negative 
estimated marginal profits. This is either due to temporary disequilibria (e.g., due to infonnation 
and contracting lags) or to the existence of significant unobservable transactions benefits (e.g., 
first mover advantages) accruing to traders. 
While price differentials are symmetric (in absolute value) between any two markets, 
intennarket transfer costs, T" commonly depend on the direction of trade since tariffs vary across 
countries and backhaul freight rates are sometimes lower than the standard freight rates going the 
opposite direction. Asymmetric transfer costs implies the need to estimate direction-specific 
regime probabilities, i.e., one vector A1j related to product moving from market i to market j and a 
• 
second vector, Aji, related to movements in the opposite direction. In general, AIJ_Aji""O, meaning 
there will not be a unique probability vector describing integration and equilibrium between two 
8 
distinct markets since direction-specific regime probabilities may differ. This is not a problem 
for measures of tradability, which is inherently a unidirectional concept. A product is tradable 
between two markets when it can or does flow from either one to the other. Bidirectional 
tradability is unnecessary for there to be transmission of Walrasian excess demand between 
markets. By contrast, equilibrium is an omnidirectional concept, in which the spatial equilibrium 
conditions should prevail in both directions (e.g., a segmented equilibrium one direction, and 
perfect integration the other). When only one of the two markets employs nontariff barriers to 
trade, equilibrium may hold in only one of two directions. By these criteria, we use the maximal 
direction-specific values of intermarket tradability and perfect integration in describing those 
market conditions between two (prospective) trading partners.4 By contrast, we use the bounds 
created by the two direction-specific results in describing the frequency of spatial market 
equilibrium. The width of that band is itself suggestive of the underlying efficiency of arbitrage 
between the markets. 
Pacific Rim Pork Industry Factor and Product Markets 
We assembled comparable monthly time series data on prices, trade flows, and the costs 
of intermarket arbitrage over the years 1990-1996 for eight commodities - feedgrains (com and 
soybean meal), slaughter hogs, chilled carcass and chilled pork cuts (bellies, hams, loins, ribs)5 
- from eight countries - Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
and the United States.6 We are unaware of any other study that uses either such comprehensive 
-

time series data on the costs of commerce or trade data combined with price and transfer cost 
data. Data are not available for precisely the same periods across countries or commodities. 
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Indeed, data are not available on some commodities for some countries. So the number of 
observations vary across commodity-specific country pairs and the number of country pairs 
available differ among commodities in the estimation results that follow. 
Because we want to account carefully for transfer costs - the observable costs of trading 
between locations - we have tried to identify precisely the spatial location from which price 
data are gathered and to include in our transfer cost series those domestic transport costs 
associated with moving product from interior price reporting locations to or from port, as well as 
the international c.iJ. and tariff costs associated with moving product from one country's port to 
another's.7 Data on transfer costs were not publicly available, so we constructed these series, 
somewhat painstakingly, from U.S. Customs data, national commodity-specific tariff schedules, 
and domestic transport cost series available from national statistical agencies. As analysts 
increasingly recognize the importance of incorporating data on transfer costs in market analysis, 
we hope that government statistical agencies will begin to make series on transfer costs more 
readily available. At present, the cost of gathering reliable, complete transactions costs time 
series poses a serious obstacle to using improved, level IT or III markets analysis methods. 
The inferential failings of conventional price analysis methods (including correlation 
coefficients, Granger causality, cointegration testing, error correction mechanisms) arise from 
characteristics of the underlying (and usually ignored) transfer costs or trade flows (Barrett 1996, 
McNew 1996, Baulch 1997, McNew and Fackler 1997). The data show that the factor and 
product markets of the Pacific Rim pork industries frequently violate assumptions on which 
existing, linear price analysis techniques depend. For example, trade discontinuity implies a 
.'
 
nonlinear or piecewise linear relationship between price series and bidirectional trade implies 
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variation in direction of flow - implying a non-constant sign of t, the transactions cost term in 
the linear spatial equilibrium model implicitly estimated - product differentiation, or both. Yet 
continuous, unidirectional trade characterizes less than six percent of the commodity-specific 
market pairs for which we gathered data; this assumption holds only for trade in primal pork cuts 
between Japan and Taiwan. And since we could not collect reliable transfer cost series between 
Japan and Taiwan, not one of the 88 commodity-specific market pairs to which we apply LBM 
fully satisfies the trade flow and transfer cost assumptions on which conventional methods rest. 
Hence the rationale for using LBM to obviate the statistical hazards of traditional price analysis 
techniques. 
Discontinuous trade or trade flow reversals frequently arise due to perturbations in the 
costs of market arbitrage, including trade policy reforms. Our data show that transfer costs are 
time-varying and nonadditive, meaning there is some multiplicative component attributable to ad 
valorem tariffs or graduated insurance or freight schedules. Moreover, they are frequently 
substantial, nonstationary or both. Figures 1 and 2 present histograms depicting the frequency 
distribution of mean transfer cost to export country domestic price ratios for direction- and 
commodity-specific market pairs. These ratios represent the period mean proportional markup 
necessary to break even on shipments from the exporting country to the importing country. 
Transfer costs tend to be greatest as a proportion of price for low value-to-weight commodities 
(i.e., feedgrains) and for longer distances traveled. Mean transfer costs were only 1.8 percent of 
export country domestic price for intra-North American trade in chilled pork products, but 
• 
averaged 221.0 percent of export country domestic price for trans-Pacific trade in feedgrains. 
What is perhaps most striking is that the direction of trade often matters too. Mean transfer costs 
11
 
are considerably higher going from North America to Asia than vice versa (Figure 2), almost 
entirely due to differences in tariff rates. For example, Japanese tariffs alone on live slaughter 
hogs averaged 39 percent of the U.S. domestic price. Similarly, while transfer costs for loins 
averaged but 1.4 percent of export price going from Canada to the United States or vice versa, 
and only 6.0 (6.1) percent from Japan to Canada (the U.S.), transfer costs averaged 121.6 (192.5) 
percent of export price going the opposite direction across the Pacific, from Canada (the United 
States) to Japan!8 Trade policy clearly matters as much as transport costs, yet has been largely 
ignored in the market integration studies we have found. 
Given secular trends toward liberalized trade through permanently lower tariff rates, it is 
intuitive that many international transfer cost time series should be nonstationary.9 Indeed, 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests find that 12 of 14 feedgrains' transfer cost series are 
nonstationary, more precisely, that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity at the 
90 percent significance level. lO Transfer costs from North America to Japan are nonstationary for 
each commodity over the 1990-96 period. Transfer costs for meat and live hogs were more 
commonly stationary than those for feedgrains, probably due to the relatively smaller role of 
tariff reduction in these commodities since many animal product trade restrictions are nontariff 
technical barriers that have been less subject to liberalization to date (Hillman 1991, Thilmany 
and Barrett 1997). With agricultural trade liberalization likely to feature prominently in the next 
round of multilateral WTO negotiations, this issue is unlikely to disappear any time soon, so 
market analysts must adopt methods better suited to the underlying conditions of international 
• 
trade and its associated costs. 
Table 2 presents the LBM estimation results. Several results stand out. First, loss­
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making trade (}"5) is extremely uncommon, occurring at ten percent or greater frequency in only 
3/88 cases, all in soybean meal trade involving Japan. When price differentials are insufficient to 
cover observable market intermediation costs, as in just over one-quarter of all these commodity­
, direction-, and period-specific observations, segmented equilibrium (}"6) prevails 91.5 percent of 
the time. I 1 Recall from Figures 1 and 2 that transfer costs are often considerably greater than the 
f.o.b. export price. Segmented equilibrium is to be expected in the face of large wedges driven 
between markets' prices by tariffs and shipping costs. While comparative disadvantage manifest 
as segmented equilibrium never occurs with positive and statistically significant probability for 
either US or Canadian producers of these eight commodities, it occurs for half the primal cuts 
from Taiwan, two-thirds from Mexico, and all the meat (cuts and carcass) from Japan. In 
general, the comparative disadvantage of Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and Taiwan in 
feed grains, hogs, and pork is apparent from the asymmetric frequency with which those source 
markets are in segmented equilibrium from the Canadian and United States markets. 
Second, segmented disequilibrium 0.'4)' where no trade occurs in spite of the apparent 
existence of positive profits, likewise appears rarely, only three percent of the time overall, and 
with five or greater percent frequency in only three cases: bellies and loins from the U.S. into 
Taiwan, and slaughter hogs from the U.S. into Canada. This likely reflects the fact that trade in 
higher value-added products and live animals tends to be most subject to nontariff trade barriers, 
but few such barriers bind completely (Hillman 1991). The observation that unprofitable trade or 
segmented disequilibrium occurs only five percent of the time is strong empirical confirmation of 
• 
the profit-making behavior of international traders operating in these markets. 
Segmented disequilibrium and inefficient integration with positive apparent profits, A3, 
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are most likely the consequence of nontariff barriers to trade (e.g., quotas, sanitary and 
phytosanitary restrictions, and private or public technical barriers) that create positive rents to 
trade by restricting the free flow of commodities between nations. Such rents exist about 11 
percent of the time overall in these markets, but with more than 22 percent frequency in the case 
of primal cuts (bellies, hams, loins, and spareribs). Part of this is likely attributable to subtle 
noncomparability of cuts that make intermarket price comparison difficult. But this likely also 
reflects the relatively greater propensity for nontariff barriers to apply to higher-value-added 
products, like chilled meats, than to raw commodities, like com, for which 1.3+1.5 occurred with 
only 1.5 percent frequency. 
In several cases the 1.2 estimates - for the no trade equilibrium within the parity bounds ­
appear rather high. This seems attributable to large standard errors (ou) on those particular 
estimates, and probably comes at the cost of lower estimates of 1.6, the segmented equilibrium. 
We therefore suspect the estimates reported here understate the frequency with which Canadian 
and U.S. producers and processors exhibit comparative advantage over their counterparts in the 
other six economies and, correspondingly, overstates the frequency with which eastward (i.e., 
from Asia to North America) intermarket tradability holds. 
Tables 3-5 offers summary descriptions of the estimated frequencies of particular market 
conditions prevailing. The most striking result is that intermarket tradability is effectively 
ubiquitous, occuring with at least 99 percent frequency in 42/44 commodity-specific market 
pairs. There is no question that the factor and product markets of Pacific Rim pork industries are 
• 
integrated in the sense of tradability. The LBM estimation results also underscore the distinction 
between tradability and equilibrium. While equilibrium prevails with at least 96 percent 
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frequency in 43/44 commodity-and-direction-specific market pairs (i.e., the upper bound on 
market equilibrium is at least 96 percent), many links suffer disequilibrium in one direction. We 
take this as an indication of nontariff (formal or informal) trade barriers, all of which involve 
Japan, the United States, or both. Market equilibrium nonetheless prevails at least two-thirds of 
the time in all products, and effectively continuously in carcass, com, and ham markets. The 
intersection of tradability and equilibrium, constant perfect market integration (}.'I+A2 =1) - for 
which existing methods implicitly test when studying either the absolute or relative versions of 
the law of one price - holds in only 17/44 market pairs. Hence the need to disentangle market 
integration-cum-tradability from spatial market equilibrium, as we can using the Li-Barrett 
method. 
The dynamics of intermarket relationships merits some discussion at this point. The 
LBM, like Baulch's (1997) parity bounds model and other switching regime models (Spiller and 
Huang 1986, Sexton et al. 1991), does not estimate the dynamics of price or intermarket 
relationships, and so is not well suited to answering questions surrounding the speed with which 
market prices converge on equilibrium. This should serve as a caution against applying LBM to 
high frequency data. Yet, for moderate-to-Iow frequency data, like the monthly series we use 
here, this method seems well-suited. For example, it takes just over two weeks, including non­
transport time, to ship chilled pork cuts from a processing plant in North Carolina by refrigerated 
truck to Seattle and then by ship to Japan. If prices between the United States and Japan are not 
in equilibrium on a monthly basis when it takes only a half-month to move product between the 
-
most distant points, that information alone is quite informative. 
... 
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Conclusions 
This paper applies a new approach - the Li-Barrett method (LBM) - to the study of 
spatial market relationships using maximum likelihood estimation of a mixture distribution 
model incorporating price, transfer cost, and trade flow data. This method generates intuitive and 
useful indicators of the frequency of intermarket tradability, competitive market equilibrium, 
perfect market integration (a tradable competitive equilibrium), segmented equilibrium, and 
segmented disequilibrium. This enables useful distinction between market integration, reflecting 
the tradability of products between spatially distinct markets, irrespective of the existence or 
absence of spatial market equilibrium, and competitive market equilibrium, in which 
extraordinary profits are exhausted by competitive pressures to yield socially efficient 
allocations, regardless of whether this results in physical trade flows between markets. In 
addition, this method is robust to time-varying, nonstationary or nonadditive transfer costs and 
discontinuous or bidirectional trade, conditions that commonly prevail in the eight Pacific Rim 
commodity markets we study. 
The LBM estimation results yield a number of clear findings with respect to the factor 
and product markets of Pacific Rim pork industries. First, these products are highly tradable 
among the eight economies we study. Second, spatial equilibrium holds significantly more often 
than not, although there remain a number of niches where the marginal profits to spatial arbitrage 
remain positive, largely reflecting binding nontariff barriers to trade, particularly those imposed 
by Asian meat importing countries. Third, while spatial equilibrium is commonplace, in many 
• 
cases that is attributable to large intermarket transfer costs that drive a substantial wedge between .. 
market prices. Continued tariff reduction, whether unilaterally or in the context of regional or 
16 
multilateral accords, would no doubt increase trade - although not the frequency of intermarket 
tradability or spatial market equilibrium - and reduce deadweight losses associated with trade 
restrictions. 
17 
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Table 1. The Six Intermarket Regimes 
Pj - Pj =Tjj Pj - Pj > Tjj Pj - Pj < Tji 
Trade Al A3 As 
No trade A2 A4 A6 
Direction 
of Trade 
Bellies 
US-CA 
CA-US 
US-1W 
1W-US 
US-MX 
MX-US 
CA-1W 
1W-CA 
Hams 
US-CA 
CA-US 
US-1W 
1W-US 
PH- US 
US - PH 
CA-1W 
1W-CA 
Loins 
US - CA 
CA-US 
IP- US 
US - JP 
CA-1W 
1W-CA 
JP- CA 
CA-JP 
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Table 2. LBM Testing Results 
Al 
Trade 
A3 As A2 
No Trade 
A4 A6 °u 
0. 
1.00* 
0.99* 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 * 
0,01 * 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98* 
0,01 * 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0.99* 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98* 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98* 
0.00 
0.97* 
0.00 
0.97* 
1.158 
0.121 
1.264 
4.202 
3.095 
3.114 
0.427 
2.105 
0.986 
1.236 
0.039 
0.465 
0.469 
0.496 
0.492 
3.140 
0.98* 
0.89* 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0,01 
0,01 
0.00 
0,01 * 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.99* 
0.00 
0.98* 
0.99* 
0.99* 
0.01 
0.00 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.99* 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98* 
0.517 
0.284 
0.996 
1.785 
0.002 
0.053 
1.347 
0.381 
0.055 
0.024 
1.004 
1.495 
0.847 
0.737 
0.769 
0.646 
0.99* 
0.99* 
0.00 
0.01* 
0,01 * 
0,01 
0.00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98* 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98* 
0.01 * 
0.01 * 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0.99* 
0.99* 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.99* 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.98* 
0.00 
0.058 
0.677 
0.179 
1.217 
1.107 
1.726 
1.734 
1.193 
0.681 
0.665 
1.944 
1.540 
1.221 
2.094 
0.393 
0.244 
..
! 
... 
19
 
US-MX 
MX-US 
US-lW 
lW-US 
Spareribs 
US-CA 
CA-US 
CA-lW 
lW-CA 
US-MX 
MX-US 
US-lW 
lW-US 
Carcasses 
US-CA 
CA-US 
US - IP 
IP - US 
US-AU 
AU-US 
US-KO 
KO-US 
CA- IP 
JP- CA 
Slaughter hogs 
US-CA 
CA-US 
CA-lW 
lW-CA 
US-lW 
0.01* 0.98* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.448 0.290 
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.98* 0.451 0.445 
0.01 0.21* 0.00 0.01 0.77* 0.00 1.554 0.168 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.97* 0.00 0.00 4.554 1.748 
0.10 0.89* 0.00 om 0.00 0.00 0.265 0.083 
0.41 * 0.02 0.00 0.56* 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.466 
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.585 
om 0.01 0.00 0.98* 0.00 0.00 0.778 2.524 
0.01 0.98* 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.934 0.588 
om* om 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.482 1.130 
0.20* 0.01* 0.00 0.78* 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.504 
0.01 om 0.00 0.97* 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.279 
0.14* 0.00 0.00 0.86* 0.00 0.00 0.578 0.330 
0.98* 0.01 * 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.165 0.139 
0.79* 0.01 * 0.00 0.20* 0.00 0.00 0.000 1.308 
0.01 0.01 0.00 om om 0.95* 0.404 0.699 
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.000 1.203 
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.711 1.485 
0.01 * 0.00 0.00 0.97* 0.01 0.00 1.015 0.038 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.97* 0.01 0.00 0.000 2.934 
0.14* 0.01 0.00 0.84* 0.01 0.01 0.001 1.356 
0.00 0.00 0.00 om 0.01 0.97* 0.423 0.662 
0.01 0.18* 0.01 * 0.30 0.50* 0.00 0.123 0.121 
0.99* 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.030 0.315 
• 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 1.358 0.954 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.97* 0.448 0.279 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.759 0.376 
l· . 
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TW- US 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99* 2.319 0.728 
US-AU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98* 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.670 
AU-US 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.029 1.845 
US - JP 0.32* 0.00 0.00 0.67* 0.01 0.00 0.638 0.456 
JP- US 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.99* 3.214 2.986 
CA- IP 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.95* 0.00 0.00 0.765 0.443 
JP- CA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.000 2.728 
US-KO 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.412 0.577 
KO-US 0.00 0.00 0.00 om 0.00 0.99* 0.001 2.178 
CA-KO 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.97* 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.782 
KO-CA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.98* 0.004 1.956 
US- PH 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.98* 0.00 0.00 0.000 2.038 
PH-US om 0.00 0.00 0.98* 0.01 0.00 0.016 1.636 
CA-PH 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 2.173 0.370 
PH-CA 0.01 * 0.01* 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.93* 0.000 1.468 
AU-CA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.427 1.599 
CA-AU 0.01 * 0.02 0.01 0.96* 0.01 0.00 1.892 0.338 
Corn 
US-CA 0.96* 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.180 0.095 
CA-US 0.65* 0.04 0.01 0.29* 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.103 
US-TW 0.31 * 0.01 0.00 0.67* 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.229 
TW-US 0.01 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.458 0.431 
US -PH 0.20* 0.00 0.00 0.80* 0.00 0.00 3.825 0.659 
PH-US om 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98* 0.433 0.477 
CA-TW 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 4.611 0.230 
TW-CA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97* om 0.00 0.701 0.012 
CA-PH 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99* 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.853 
PH-CA 0.01 * 0.03 om 0.93* 0.02 0.00 0.299 0.082 
Soybean Meal 
US-CA 0.91 * 0.01 0.06* 0.00 0.00 0.00 110.195 Om8 
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CA-US 0.88* 0.00 0.00 0.12* 0.00 0.00 0.324 0.077 
lW-CA 0.53* 0.02 0.01 0.41 * 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.359 
CA-lW 0.22* 0.00 0.00 0.78* 0.00 0.00 0.368 0.207 
CA- JP 0.01 0.17 0.82* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.013 0.088 
JP- CA 0.77* 0.01* om 0.01 * 0.01* 0.19* 1.415 0.475 
US - JP 0.14 0.33* 0.34* 0.18* 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.065 
JP- US 0.01* om 0.39* 0.01* 0.01 0.57* 0.000 0.513 
US-lW 0.52* 0.00 0.00 0.48* 0.00 0.00 0.184 0.030 
lW-US 0.01 * 0.01 * 0.09* 0.01 0.01* 0.87* 6.855 0.386 
AU = Australia, CA= Canada, JP = Japan, KO = Korea, MX = Mexico, PH = Philippines, lW = Taiwan, US = 
United States 
* statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level using standard errors computed using the 
Gallant-Holly method. 
Due to rounding error, rows do not always sum to one. 
•
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Table 3. Estimates of Intermarket Condition Frequencies for Canada 
Perfect Market Intermarket Market 
Integration Tradability Equilibrium 
Product	 Other Market "'1+"'2 "'1+"'2+"'3+"'5 "'1+"'2+"'6 
Bellies	 Taiwan 0.99 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 
United States 1.00 1.00 (0.99, 1.00) 
Hams Taiwan 1.00 1.00 (0.99, 1.00) 
United States 0.98 1.00 (0.94, 0.98) 
Loins Japan 0.01 0.99 (0.01, 0.99) 
Taiwan 1.00 1.00 (1.00,1.00) 
United States 0.99 1.00 (0.99,0.99) 
Spareribs Taiwan 1.00 1.00 (0.99, 1.00) 
United States 0.97 1.00 (0.11, 0.97) 
Carcasses Japan 0.98 0.99 (0.98, 0.99) 
United States 1.00 1.00 (0.99, 1.00) 
Slaughter 
Hogs	 Australia 0.99 1.00 (0.97,0.99) 
Korea 0.99 1.00 (0.99,0.99) 
Philippines 1.00 1.00 (0.95, 1.00) 
Taiwan 0.99 0.99 (0.99,0.99) 
United States 0.99 1.00 (0.31, 0.99) 
Corn	 Philippines 1.00 1.00 (0.94, 1.00) 
Taiwan 1.00 1.00 (0.97, 1.00) 
United States 0.96 0.99 (0.94,0.96) 
Soybean 
Meal Japan 0.78 1.00 (0.01,0.97) 
Taiwan 1.00 1.00 (0.95, 1.00) 
United States 1.00 1.00 (0.91, 1.00) 
-
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Table 4. Estimates of Intermarket Condition Frequencies for ~he United States 
Product Other Market 
Bellies Canada 
Mexico 
Taiwan 
Hams Canada 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Loins Canada 
Japan 
Mexico 
Taiwan 
Spareribs Canada 
Mexico 
Taiwan 
Carcasses Australia 
Canada 
Japan 
Korea 
Slaughter 
Hogs Australia 
Canada 
Korea 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Corn Canada 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Soybean 
Meal Canada 
Japan 
Taiwan 
Perfect Market
 
Integration
 
A)+A2 
1.oo 
0.02 
0.01 
0.98 
1.oo 
0.99 
0.99 
0.02 
0.02 
0.98 
0.97 
1.00 
0.98 
1.oo 
1.oo 
0.99 
0.98 
1.oo 
0.99 
1.oo 
0.99 
0.99 
0.96 
1.oo 
0.98 
1.oo 
0.32 
1.oo 
Intermarket
 
Tradability
 
A)+A2+A3+As 
1.oo 
1.oo 
0.01 
1.oo 
1.oo 
0.99 
1.oo 
1.oo 
1.oo 
0.99 
1.oo 
1.oo 
0.99 
1.oo 
1.oo 
1.oo 
0.99 
1.oo 
1.oo 
1.oo 
1.oo 
0.99 
0.99 
1.oo 
0.99 
1.oo 
0.99 
1.oo 
Market
 
Equilibrium
 
A)+A2+A6 
(0.99, 1.oo) 
(0.02, 0.99) 
(0.01, 0.99) 
(0.94, 0.98) 
(0.99, 1.oo) 
(0.99, 1.oo) 
(0.99,0.99) 
(0.02, 0.99) 
(0.02, 1.00) 
(0.02. 0.98) 
(0.11, 0.97) 
(0.0 I, 1.oo) 
(0.98.0.98) 
(1.OO, 1.oo) 
(0.99, 1.00) 
(0.97,0.99) 
(0.98.0.98) 
(0.98, 1.oo) 
(0.31,0.99) 
(1.oo, 1.00) 
(0.99, 0.99) 
<0.99, 0.99) 
(0.94, 0.96) 
(0.99, 1.oo) 
(0.98, 1.oo) 
(0.91, 1.oo) 
(0.32, 0.59) 
<0.89, 1.oo) 
• 
~. 
24 
Table 5. Mean Estimates of Intermarket Condition Frequencies by Product 
Perfect Market Intermarket Market 
Integration Tradability Equilibrium 
Product A]+A2 A]+A2+A3+AS A]+A2+A6 
Bellies 0.50 0.75 0.75 
Hams 0.99 1.00 0.99
 
Loins 0.50 0.99 0.67
 
Spareribs 0.99 1.00 0.76
 
Carcasses 0.99 1.00 0.99
 
Slaughter 0.98 1.00 0.94
 
Hogs 
Corn 0.99 1.00 0.98 
Soybean Meal 0.82 1.00 0.76 
The first two columns are the unweighted arithmetic means of the maximal direction-specific estimate from 
each country pair. The last column is the unweighted arithmetic mean of the direction-specific estimates. 
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Figure 1: Transfer cost proportions by commodity type 
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Figure 2: Transfer cost proportions by geography of trade 
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Notes 
1. Barrett (1996) presents a hierarchical classification of markets analysis methods based on the 
nature of the data used. Level I methods use only price data and are most susceptible to 
specification error. Level IT methods combine price and transactions cost data. Level IT methods 
are relatively recent innovations and represent the current frontier. Level III methods, combining 
price, transactions cost and trade flows data, were predicted to offer greater flexibility and ~ 
inference. 
2. Goldberg and Knetter (1997: 1245), reflecting the bulk of the literature, claim that "[a]ny 
perfectly competitive market is characterized by the condition that price equals marginal cost. 
Therefore a perfectly competitive market must be integrated." The claim in the second sentence 
relies on the assumption of an interior solution, i.e., continuous tradability. When comer 
solutions occur - as manifest by no trade - segmented equilibria are possible. Since trade can 
also occur without perfect competition - as in the case of binding quotas - equilibrium is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for integration, nor vice versa. 
3. Baulch's (1997) PBM is a special case of our model that applies when there is no variation in 
trading status (Le., A=1 all periods or A=O all periods), in which case the only available 
information comes from price and transfer cost data. 
4. Equivalently, the minima are the most appropriate estimates for market segmentation between 
a pair of markets (A4+A6). 
5. Since the mid-1980s, chilled meats have overtaken frozen meats in international commerce, 
apparently because consumers prefer the quality of chilled over frozen meat. 
6. Different countries' authorities define and report data on these products slightly differently. 
Although we have taken pains to ensure reasonable comparability among the series, these are 
surely not perfectly homogeneous commodities across all the countries. Details on all the data 
series are available in Barrett et al. (1997). 
7. Note that the cif costs include more than just transport costs. Thus our series tend to be 
somewhat higher and more comprehensive than the International Wheat Council's freight rate 
series for heavy grains, which has occasionally been used by researchers, or the Ocean Freight 
Rate Report series available from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service. 
8. During the period 1990-96, Canada imposed no tariffs on imported pork or slaughter hogs. 
The United States imposed a specific duty of 2.2 cents per kilogram on primal pork cuts, but no 
duty on carcasses or slaughter hogs. Pork from Canada to the United States became duty free 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was effective January 1994 by 
Presidential Proclamation 6641 of December 15,1993. Taiwan imposed a 15% (10%) ad 
valorem duty on pork and carcasses (on slaughter hogs). Japan employed a more complex ... 
variable rate schedule under which specific duties apply over some ranges, ad valorem tariffs 
over others, all tied to variable trigger prices. 
29 
9. There is also evidence that macroeconomic shocks may also add to international trade costs 
through their effects on the incidence of sea piracy, which occurs disproportionately in Asian 
waters and has risen sharply in the wake of the east Asian crisis (Sullivan and Jordan 1999). 
10. Detailed test results are available from the authors by request. 
11. This comparison is made by dividing the point estimate by the sum of the estimates across a 
category (e.g., ).,/0"5+).,6)' 
•
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